In this paper, I model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. I derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker replicator equation that describes dynamics of pure strategy frequencies. I then investigate the evolution of not only frequencies of pure strategies but also of total distribution of mixed strategies. I show that the process of natural selection of strategies for all games obeys the dynamical Principle of minimum of information gain. It is also shown a principle difference between mixed-strategies Hawk-Dove (HD) game and all other games (Prisoner's Dilemma, Harmony and Stag-Hunt games). Mathematically, the limit distribution of strategies is non-singular and the information gain tends to a finite value for HD-game, in contrast with all other games. Biologically, the process of natural selection in HD-game follows non-Darwinian "selection of everybody" but for all other games we observe Darwinian "selection of the fittest".
e.g., (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Webb 2007 ). In the simplest problem formulation, it is assumed that every individual can adopt only a single pure strategy; the population is divided into two subpopulations with frequencies   xt and   1 xt  such that all individuals in the first subpopulation adopt strategy 1 (defectors) and in the second subpopulation they adopt strategy 0 (cooperators). Then the dynamics of the frequency   xtis described by the Taylor-Jonker replicator equation
where 00 10 A G G , The main results on stability properties of replicator dynamics can be found in (Cressman, 1992; Hoffbauer and Zigmund, 1998) . 4 In addition to the two described approaches to studying evolutionary games, namely, studying evolutionarily stable strategies and modeling the dynamics of strategy frequencies, we develop here a third approach, which generalizes the second one. Specifically, we model and study the process of natural selection between all possible mixed strategies in the population. In what follows we assume that every individual can adhere not only to one "pure" strategy but can adopt each strategy with its own (hereditary) probabilities, i.e. keep a mixed strategy. We derive and solve an equation that is a natural generalization of the Taylor-Jonker replicator equation (0.1). We then investigate the evolution of not only frequencies of pure strategies but of total distribution of mixed strategies.
The model and the main equations
Let   , lt be the set of all individuals that adopt strategy 1 (defection) with probability  and strategy 0 (cooperation) with probability 1   ; we refer to the subpopulation   , lt as  -clone. Then   ,0 lt consists only of "cooperators" and   ,1 lt consists only of "defectors"; in the simplest case, the total population consists of these two clones only. In our case, there exists an indefinite number of mixed strategies, which can be adopted by individuals from the population, and each mixed strategy is characterized by its own value of the parameter ,0 1   . In what follows we will denote the density of  -clone also by   , lt . Our aim is to trace the natural selection of mixed strategies in process of "honest competition"; this process is described by the evolution of distribution of the parameter  .
In order to formulate a mathematical model, let us introduce the necessary notations and exact definitions. Let   0, P  be the pdf (probability density function) of the initial distribution of the parameter  . Let 0 S be the support of (0, 
to be the frequency of defectors in the total population, and
to be the frequency of cooperators in the population, so that 1. xy  Then the frequency of defectors
where   t E  is the mean value of the parameter  at t moment over the probability (1.1).
Following standard assumptions of two-strategy evolutionary game theory, we assume that This equation describes the dynamics of clones in a "mixed strategy game": the outcome of this game is determined by the payoff matrix, initial distribution of the parameter , and the equation
Furthermore, we may assume that each individual in the population has an initial fitness of 0 F ; a standard assumption is that 0 F corresponds to the logistic growth, i.e. 0 1 N Fr K
where , rK are positive constants. Then
Notice that the initial fitness of 0 F affects the dynamics of clone sizes and total population size but does not change the dynamics of frequencies of defectors and cooperators, or the distribution of the parameter  . For this reason, we focus only on equation (1.3).
Taking into account that 
According to the Price' covariance equation [Price 1970 , Robertson 1968 ; see also Rice 2006] applied to (1.6),
2), we have proven the following
Due to importance of this Statement, in s.3 we provide a direct proof of (1.7).
It is clear that replicator equation (0.1) is a particular case of equation ( One can recognize here a particular case of the well-known problem of "dynamical insufficiency" of the Price' equation: it cannot be used alone to determine dynamics of the model over time because in order to compute the mean value of a trait one needs to know its variance, and in order to compute the variance (2 nd order moment), one needs to know 3 rd order moment, etc. (see, e.g., Barton, Turelli, 1987; Frank, 1997) . A way to overcome the dynamical insufficiency of the Price' equation was suggested in (Karev, 2010a) . We use this approach in the next section.
Solution to the replicator equation
The only way to overcome the problem of dynamical insufficiency of equation ( 
Then, denoting for brevity
we can write the solution to equation (1.4) as
be the mgf (moment generation function) of the initial distribution   0, P  of parameter  ; we assume that this function is known. Then
The 
is the main step in our approach to solving replicator equation (1.7). With its solution, we are able to compute the distribution of mixed strategies at every time moment using an explicit formula (2.5); we can now also compute other characteristics of interest, in particular, the frequencies of cooperators and defectors by formula (2.1).
Recall that (2.6) ); in what follows it would be useful to rewrite
In order to avoid trivial cases and technical details, we will assume as a rule, that the support of the initial distribution is an entire interval   0,1 , i.e.   0 0 P   for all 01   . In this case the support of the current distribution ( , ), according to (2.5) is also an entire interval [0,1];
therefore [ ] > 0 for all t. 
Equilibria of frequencies
Corollary. Equation Overall, all equilibria of general equation (1.7) are identical to corresponding equilibria of standard equation (0.1), but dynamics of the frequency   xt may be different. An example is given below (see s.5, Figure 7 ). Now we are able to study not only dynamics of frequency     t x t E   , but also the dynamics of distribution of the parameter  . For any specific game, this dynamics is completely determined by the values A, B, and the mgf 0 M of the initial distribution of parameter  . Let us now summarize the main formulas, which will be used later:
Dynamics of the distribution of strategies

Replicator equation
The process of natural selection of strategies in model (1.3) is captured by the evolution
It is well known (see, e.g., [Hofbauer, Zigmund, 1998 ]) that the pdf   , P t a solves the replicator equation of the form
According to definition (1.5) of the function
The solution to this equation is given by formulas (3.2) -(3.4).
Now, in order to investigate the process of natural selection of strategies, we may take initial distribution of the parameter as uniform in
A more general case is the truncated exponential distribution in   The uniform distribution is a limit case of truncated exponential as → 0.
One more representative case is normal distribution truncated on the interval   
Prisoner's dilemma
A large body of literature is devoted to the discussion and investigation of different versions of the game known as Prisoner's dilemma (PD). In this game, defection strategy gives the player a higher payoff than cooperation strategy irrespective of which strategy is used by the second player; therefore, a rational individual should defect. However, both players would get higher payoff if they cooperated, which makes this a dilemma (the mathematical example and corresponding payoff matrix is shown below).
The PD-game is widely applied to many social and behavioral problems, but also has (perhaps, limited) applications to some biological situations, see, e.g., (Broom& Rychtár, 2013, ch.4, Turner & Lin Chao, 1999); an extreme case of the PD-game is the well-known "tragedy of the commons", a situation when the strategy of over-exploitation of a shared resource on which the population depends (defecting) rather than preserving it (cooperating) can lead to resource destruction and consequent population collapse (Hardin 1998) .
It is well known that the frequency of defectors tends to 1 for a two-person two strategy PD-game. This statement is also true for mixed-strategy PD game. Elements of the payoff matrix of such a PD game satisfy the inequalities 10 00 11 01
Then, according to assertions 1) and 2) of Theorem 1,   We can see that the dynamics of the distribution of parameter  is identical to the dynamics of the distribution of the Malthusian parameter in the simplest inhomogeneous Malthusian model given by the equation
This model describes dynamics of a population, which consists of clones   , lt that grow exponentially and independently of each other; the model was studied in detail in application to global demography in [Karev 2005 ].
Consider a numerical example of mixed strategy PD game with the payoff matrix
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; 20 The following Figure 2 shows the dynamics of initial normal truncated distribution of the parameter  . Coordination Game or SH game.
The Coordination game, also known as Stag Hunt (SH) game, is characterized by bistability, when both equilibria x=0 and x=1 are stable and there exists an unstable equilibrium 0 < * < 1 that divides the domains of attraction of the stable equilibria. This game is defined by the payoff matrix, whose elements satisfy 00 > 10 , 11 Figure 3 ). As we can see, in this game a very small difference in the initial distribution can lead to dramatic differences in the outcomes of natural selection of strategies. The SH-game is an example of situation when the selection of one or another pure strategy crucially depends on the initial composition of the population, and so any random perturbation can have dramatic effects of the predicted outcome.
Natural selection of strategies in a "Hawk-Dove" game
The "Hawk-Dove" (HD-) game was introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) and can be described as follows. Consider individuals within a population competing for resources V. Doves avoid confrontation, while hawks provoke fights. Thus, on average, two doves will share the resources and the average increase in fitness for doves is V/2. A dove that encounters a hawk will leave all the resource to the hawk. If a hawk meets a hawk, they escalate until one of the two gets knocked out. The winner's fitness is increased by V, while loser's fitness is reduced by C, so that the average increase in fitness is (V -C)/2, which is negative if the cost of the injury exceeds the gain from winning the fight.
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The importance of HD game was clearly explained by [Webb 2007, s.8.4] : "The biological significance of the Hawk-Dove game is that it provides an alternative to groupselectionist arguments for the persistence of species whose members have potentially lethal attributes (teeth, horns, etc.). The question to be answered is the following. Because it is obviously advantageous to fight for a resource (having it all is better than sharing), why don't animals always end up killing (or at least seriously maiming) each other? The group-selectionist answer is that any species following this strategy would die out pretty quickly, so animals hold back from all out contests "for the good of the species". The "problem" with this is that it seems to require more than just individual-based Natural Selection to be driving Evolution. So, if group selection is the only possible answer, then that would be a very important result. However, the This result is well known for the two-strategy HD game. However, the approach developed in previous sections allows us to expand it by tracing the process of natural selection of strategies for a mixed strategy HD game to obtain some new and interesting results. Notice that in cases of PD and SH mixed strategy games the final distribution of strategies is always concentrated in the points 0   or 1   , i.e. only one pure strategy can be selected over time.
In contrast, the set of possible limit stationary distributions for HD game is extremely rich. 
The current distribution of the parameter  given the initial distribution   0, Here we denote   * E  to be the mean value of  with respect to distribution   * P  . It follows from (5.1) that all mixed strategies that were present in the population initially do not disappear over time but remain in the population indefinitely.
A classic example of a Hawk-Dove game is defined by the following payoff matrix: 4) . However, the final value * x does not depend on the initial distribution, as can be seen in Figure 5 . 
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Complete information about the process of natural selection of strategies can be obtained from dynamics of the distribution of parameter  . Let the initial distribution be truncated exponential.
Then the current distribution at the moment t is also truncated exponential with pdf The dynamics of distribution of the parameter  given by formula (5.5) is shown in Fig. 7 . We have seen that the total frequency of defectors, which is equal to   t E  , tends to
in accordance with known results. A new piece of information is that the distribution of mixed strategies characterized by the parameter tends over time to the truncated exponential distribution, whose mean value is equal to the limit frequency of defectors.
Notice that the support of all current and limit distributions coincides with the support of initial distribution regardless of what initial distribution was. This means that all mixed strategies that are present initially will also be present in the final state of the system.
Let us now assume that the initial distribution is normal truncated in the interval [0,1]. A typical evolution of truncated normal distribution is shown on Figure 8 . is truncated normal with 1 , 0.01 3 ms .
The "game of chicken" is just a version of the HD-game and differs only in interpretation. A standard example of this game is given by the following payoff matrix:
For this game
Ac  , 20 B c b    , so condition 1) of Theorem 1 holds and * 01
Ac
is a stable limit frequency of defectors.
The dynamics of defector frequency is defined by the equation (1.7) , which now reads
If 2c b c  , then 0 B  , and the 'game of chicken' becomes Prisoner's Dilemma, where * 1
x  is a single equilibrium frequency of defectors. If 2 cb  then * 1
x  is also a single limit value of the frequency. We are also able to trace the dynamics of the distribution of  given by formulas (3.2), (3.4) where now
If the initial distribution of  is truncated exponential 
Natural selection of strategies and the Principle of minimum of information gain
In this section we show that the dynamics of the distribution of strategies as it was described by formulas (3.2) -(3.4) obey the Principle of Minimum Information Gain for all considered games.
The Principle was developed in information statistics and is based on the hypothesis that given a prior probability distribution m and precisely defined prior data, the probability distribution p that best represents the current state of knowledge is the distribution that minimizes KLdivergence between p and m (after Kullback-Liebler, 1951 [ : ] is known also as relative or cross-entropy in natural sciences; therefore, the principle of minimum of information gain is mathematically equivalent to the Principle of Minimum of relative or cross-entropy, known as MinxEnt for brevity.
The MinxEnt was successfully applied to various statistical, physical and biological problems as a method for inference of unknown distributions, subject to some given constraints.
The importance of the Principle of minimum of relative entropy and its special case, the Principle of maximum entropy, was demonstrated by Jaynes and his followers, who showed that essentially all known statistical mechanics can be derived from this principle; see (Jaynes 1957 (Jaynes , 2003 for further details and applications of the MaxEnt principle.
A serious objection against this approach in natural sciences is that the principle of maximum of entropy does not follow from the basic laws and hence may not be postulated as an independent assertion but should follow from the system dynamics. The problem was clearly formulated by A. Einstein (1910) : "…the statistics of a system should follow from its dynamics and, in principle, could not be postulated a priori". It is a way to obtain a satisfactory rationale of the MaxEnt principle, but it was not realized (and probably could not be realized) in statistical physics.
It was shown in (Karev 2010b ) that within the frameworks of mathematical theory of selection, MinxEnt is not an external independent hypothesis but is a strong mathematical assertion, which follows from the dynamics of corresponding models. Below we give a direct proof of this statement in application to our models of strategy selection.
A general theory for applications of the Principle of minimum of information gain was developed in (Kullback 1997 For example, if there is no any additional information, then the MinxEnt distribution (6.2) in an interval is uniform; if the mean of the distribution is the only estimated quantity, then the MinxEnt distribution (for ≥ 0) is exponential with the estimated mean; if the mean and variance are estimated, then the MinxEnt distribution (for −∞ < < ∞) is normal with the estimated mean and variance; see (Kapur, 1989) Therefore, the following theorem holds:
The current strategy distribution (2.5) provides minimum of information gain The Principle of minimum of information gain is not an external hypothesis but a mathematical theorem within the frameworks of the model of strategy selection. It can therefore be considered an underlying variational principle, which governs the selection process for all games at every time moment.
Discussion
In this paper, we investigated the process of natural selection of mixed strategies in classical two-player two-strategy games. The current state of the strategy selection process is described by the probability distribution of the parameter  , which represents the (heritable) probability of an individual keeping one of two strategies. This distribution can be considered as a distribution of mixed strategies in the game, and its dynamics is the main problem of interest.
The problem was completely solved using the hidden keystone variable (HKV)-method;
the distribution of the parameter  at any time moment is defined by formulas (3.2) -(3.4). The dynamics of frequencies of pure strategies is described by the equation (1.7) , which generalizes a well-known replicator equation by Taylor& Jonker (1978).
These general results were applied to several known games. We were able to show that the dynamics of strategy distributions in Prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Harmony (H) games essentially depend on the initial distribution of mixed strategies. In both cases the limit distribution is singular, i.e. only a pure strategy can be selected over time from all possible mixed strategies, in accordance to known results.
Similarly, in the Stag Hunt (SH)-game, only one pure strategy can be selected over time but the initial population composition, and more specifically, its mean value, has a critical impact on what strategy will finally be selected. For this reason the result of natural selection of strategies may look like a random process, since it critically depends on (perhaps, random) variations of initial composition of the population.
In all of these cases, only a single pure strategy can be selected; we can interpret these outcomes as "Darwinian selection" of the "fittest" strategy.
In contrast, in the Hawk-Dove (HD) game, not only the overall dynamics but also the shape of final distribution of mixed strategies depends on the initial distribution. The final distribution is not singular, and any mixed strategy that was initially present in the population will be present in the final distribution. We can interpret this outcome as "non-Darwinian survival of everybody." Another principal difference of HD-game from all other games is that KL-divergence between current and initial distribution of strategies (information gain) tends to a finite value, while it tends to infinity for all other games. We would like to emphasize that HDgame has a clear biological interpretation and may be used to explain the persistence of species, whose members have potentially lethal attributes.
Interestingly, the process of natural selection of strategies for all games obeys the dynamical Principle of minimum of information gain. It means that given the initial distribution and the value of frequency of one of pure strategies, at any time moment the current distribution of mixed strategies provides minimum of information gain over all probability distributions.
Formally, we can postulate this principle (as Kullback and Jaynes did in statistics and statistical physics accordingly) and then construct the solution to the model by solving a corresponding variational problem. What is important is that now we know for certain that this way we obtain the distribution that exactly coincides with the solution to the model. Hence, the Principal of minimum of information gain is the underlying optimization principle, whose "invisible hand" governs the process of strategy selection in all games.
